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5. (Internal Use Only - RJK) Delivered a FBIS item in which his name was mentioned to the office of Senator Adlai E. Stevenson, III (D., Ill.).

6. (Unclassified - RJK) Delivered a China Atlas to the offices of Senators Abraham Ribicoff (D., Conn.), and William B. Spong, Jr. (D., Va.), and also to Donald Elisburg, Labor Subcommittee, of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee.

7. (Confidential - JMM) Called Park Rinard, Administrative Assistant to Senator Harold Hughes, to say I would like an appointment to meet with the Senator to discuss an article about the Agency in the March issue of Earth magazine, in which Senator Stuart Symington told us Hughes was interested. Mr. Rinard said the Senator was tied up with hearings all this week but Rinard would call us back to try to work out a date.

8. (Confidential - JMM) Talked to Russ Blandford, Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, who said Chairman Lucien Nedzi, Intelligence Subcommittee, had agreed not to call the Director to appear in open session regarding the Hebert/Arends bill (H. R. 9853) on security classification. However Mr. Nedzi would like the Director to come up for an informal and off-the-record session with the Subcommittee to explain the nature and rationale of classification policies in the intelligence community, the reasons for a high degree of secrecy in connection with all types of intelligence activities, and why it is not feasible automatically to declassify material from the community after the expiration of any set period. He said it would be particularly useful if the Director could give some specific illustrations of the damage that has resulted, or could result, from a more liberal classification policy.

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14. (Secret - JGO) Met with Mr. John R. Blandford, Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, who told me that Chairman Nedzi has cancelled the hearings of the Intelligence Subcommittee scheduled to start tomorrow pending the release of the amended Executive Order 10501 on classification which he told me is expected within the next week. Mr. Blandford also filled me in on his conversations with Mr. Maury concerning an informal off-the-record meeting of the Director with the Subcommittee before Committee hearings are undertaken. 25X1

With regard to Mr. Blandford's meeting next Tuesday with the Agency Advanced Intelligence Seminar, he will use the main Committee room, 2119 RHOB, rather than the small Subcommittee room that was originally scheduled. He told me also that Committee security procedures have been developed for record internal control of classified documents in the possession of the Committee. Mrs. Innis McDonald, long-time staff member, will head up this procedure. It is his feeling, however, that as in the past, documents for the Chairman or highly classified Agency material should be kept outside the routine Committee record procedures.

I briefed Mr. Blandford on the following items: ChiCom Mao-class submarine, and delivery of MIG-19s to North Korea; Soviet SH-04 ABM, A-class nuclear attack submarine, nuclear storage facilities in east Europe, naval vessels enroute to Cuba, and the disabled H-2 class nuclear powered cruise type submarine.

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10. (Confidential - JMM) Called Fran Watkins, in the office of Representative Durward Hall, in response to his note passed to the Director during a briefing of the House Armed Services Committee in which Hall inquired about Agency relations with the other services. We agreed to meet at 0930 on 8 March. Mr. Tweedy will accompany me to the meeting.

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12. (Unclassified - LLM) Jane Lawton, in the office of Speaker Carl Albert, called with reference to our previous conversation on a constituent interested in the possibility of Agency employment and asked if we could arrange for an interview for [REDACTED] and I told her we would be back in touch if we couldn't work something out within the next week. [REDACTED] is making arrangements.

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
13. (Internal Use Only - LLM) Spoke with Tom Hart, Chief Consultant, House Committee on Education and Labor, and he said that he felt the conference committee would reach final agreement on the Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act, S. 2515, sometime tonight. He was quite positive that our position would be sustained.

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9. (Secret - JMM) John Lehman, on the White House staff, called to ask if the Agency was appearing this week before the Nedzi Subcommittee regarding the Hebert/Arends bill (H.R. 9853) on security of classified information. I said we were not, in view of our policy against appearing in open session. Lehman was glad to hear this. He asked my views about trying to delay hearings on this subject until next month so that the Administration's position could be clarified and further work completed in the NSSM 13 exercise. I said one argument against delay was the possibility that the Moorhead Subcommittee would pick up the ball and run with it, and I thought we were better off dealing with Nedzi. Lehman said this was a consideration which hadn't occurred to them, and maybe they had better take another look. He asked how we were getting along with Nedzi and I said there were no major problems at this stage. This seemed to surprise him. 25X1



11. (Confidential - JGO) Talked to Mr. Bruce Clarke, OSR, who told me he had a good meeting with Mr. Fred Wikner, assistant to Dr. John S. Foster, Director of Defense Research & Engineering, Department of Defense, and relayed to him the information provided in the meeting with Mr. Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, concerning differences in the information provided by the Director and Dr. Foster on Soviet R&D. Mr. Clarke will brief Mr. Slatinshek on the meeting.

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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Thursday - 24 February 1972

1. (Internal Use Only - JGO) After checking with Mr. John Unumb and Mr. Arthur Rosen, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, I called Mr. Gerard Schiappa, Administrative Assistant to Representative Louis Wyman (R., N.H.), in response to his letter of 18 February 1972. I told Mr. Schiappa that we do not copy TV newscast in the States nor does the Department of State and that it was the Department of State's suggestion that the principal source for copies of network TV newscast would be the particular network. I suggested also that he might want to check the Public Affairs Office, Department of Defense, to see whether they might have a copy for their overseas program. Mr. Schiappa thanked me for the call and the DOD suggestion. He also indicated no further response to Representative Wyman's letter is necessary.

2. (Confidential - JGO) Met separately with Messrs. Frank Slatinshek and John Ford, House Armed Services Committee staff, and discussed with them the blind memorandum of 23 February, "Moscow's View of Force Reductions in Europe." This memorandum is in response to Mr. Slatinshek's request of Friday as a followup to the question raised by Representative Randall (D., Mo.) after the Director's briefing of 8 February.



4. (Confidential - JGO) I talked to Russ Blandford, Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, who told me that the "meeting" with Chairman Nedzi tomorrow is not an Intelligence Subcommittee meeting. It relates to a special operation. He closed by saying "we (the Agency) can forget about it." I thanked him for the information.

As for Mr. Blandford's talk to the Advanced Intelligence Seminar on 7 March, the title "The Way Things Are" was agreed for use on the OTR agenda.

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23 February 1972

MEMORANDUM

Moscow's View of Force Reductions in Europe

1. *Is there any serious consideration of MBFR by the Soviets?*

We do not think the Soviets attach much urgency to MBFR. For years they have talked about negotiating a reduction of military force levels in Europe. Despite this, Moscow has never indicated in any specific fashion what it has in mind, and has rebuffed Western efforts-- NATO's explorer Brosio being the latest example-- to find out.

The Soviets probably are primarily interested in manipulating the MBFR issue for political purposes. For example, they realize that by showing a willingness to discuss force reductions, they help their chances for convening a Conference on European Security.

2. *What are the advantages that might be gained by the Soviets?*

As mentioned above, from a purely political standpoint, Moscow knows that a continued willingness to discuss force reductions helps its detente efforts, spotlights the "temporary" nature of the US presence, and causes further strains in the NATO alliance. From a military standpoint, the Soviets probably could save a little money and deploy some of their forces more efficiently, especially along the Sino-Soviet border where they have a real concern.

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3. *Is there a basis for feeling that the Soviets would be willing to enter into an MBFR agreement?*

They would probably be willing to enter into negotiations, but it is by no means clear that they would be willing to enter into any agreement that was not distinctly to their advantage. Events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 have since been compounded by internal difficulties in Poland, by the continued obstreperousness of Romania, and by current uncertainties in Tito's Yugoslavia. Even minimal Soviet force reductions in Europe now might produce a change in the political atmosphere in Eastern Europe inimical to Moscow's interests.

As for the essential ingredients of an agreement, the Soviets have made clear that they do not buy the Western concept of "balanced" force reductions and the asymmetrical approach that this concept implies. The Soviets claim to favor "percentage" reduction of forces, meaning that whatever reductions take place must be equal in both the political and numerical sense.

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8. (Secret - GLC) Mr. Donald Steininger called to say he had been invited by Mr. John McLucas, Under Secretary of the Air Force, to be present when McLucas meets with Representatives Nedzi and Price and others to brief them on his program. I suggested that Steininger raise this with the Director. However, when a light query to Mr. Russ Blandford, Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, indicated there was no need for Agency involvement in this meeting, Messrs. Steininger and Tweedy decided it would be best not to accept the invitation and Steininger is so advising the Pentagon.

9. (Confidential - GLC) Mr. Harry Fisher, D/Personnel, advised he had talked with Mr. Hamilton Harper, in the office of Senator Lowell P. Weicker (R., Conn.), regarding his inquiry on behalf of an Agency employee who is scheduled for retirement. Fisher reported that Harper seemed to appreciate the reason for our retirement policy and said there was no need for us to answer a letter from their office which had already been dispatched to us on this case.

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
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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Wednesday - 23 February 1972

1. (Confidential - JMM) Received a call from Miss Kotarbo, secretary to Mr. William Loeb, publisher of the Manchester Union Leader, confirming a meeting in Mr. Loeb's office with Miss Jessie Gill and Mr. Loeb (or in his absence, Mr. Tracy, managing editor, or Mr. Buckman, executive editor of the paper) with Agency representatives on Friday, 3 March, at 3 p.m. 25X1



3. (Internal Use Only - JMM) Met with Russ Blandford and Frank Slatinshek, House Armed Services Committee staff, regarding Chairman Nedzi's request for an Agency witness to appear in connection with H.R. 9853, establishing a commission on classification and protection of information. See Memorandum for the Record.

4. (Internal Use Only - JMM) Called Miss Mary Shinkwin, Secretary to Senator John V. Tunney (D., Calif.), to say that Mr. David Silver of the Mirisch Corporation, about whom Senator Tunney had written the Director, should call Mr. Angus Thuermer in connection with his interest in getting some footage of the CIA building in connection with a film.

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OLC 72-0229

23 February 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Russ Blandford and Frank Slatinshek
Regarding H. R. 9853 (Establishing a Commission on
Classification and Protection of Information)

1. Today Mr. Cary and I met with Messrs. Blandford and Slatinshek, Chief Counsel and Assistant Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, and William Hogan, of the Committee staff, regarding the above bill. I said the Director was strongly of the opinion that subjecting the Agency to the nature and effectiveness of its security procedures in the manner contemplated would make it impossible for us to maintain the security standards we believe necessary to do our job. I said for this reason we strongly recommended a complete exemption from the provisions of the bill. In support of this contention, I cited the Director's statutory responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

2. Messrs. Blandford and Slatinshek said they fully understood our position so far as an exemption was concerned but they raised a question as to whether this statutory responsibility regarding "sources and methods" applied only to CIA, or to the intelligence community as a whole. I pointed out that the language was ambiguous in this regard, and Blandford said that unless it could be demonstrated that the language was intended to apply only to the Agency, then we would be in for a real problem since the Committee would hold the Director responsible for the security procedures of all members of the intelligence community. I recalled the legislative history of this provision, which actually arose from the concern of other intelligence agencies to ensure that the information they provided the Director was properly safeguarded by him. In concluding this part of the discussion, it was agreed that the above-mentioned provisions were fuzzy at best and we had just as well leave them that way.

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3. Regarding a complete exemption, Blandford said that despite the logic of the situation, it was politically unrealistic to think we could get such specific language without:

- a. Inviting charges of "whitewash" by our oversight Subcommittee from other committees and members.
- b. Allegations from the press that CIA, as the worst offender in withholding information from the public, was being given special treatment.
- c. Spurring NSA, DIA and perhaps the FBI to demand similar exemption, thus making the whole process a farce.

Blandford asked whether we couldn't settle for some less specific language.

4. I asked if we could achieve our purposes of at least a de facto exemption by a provision ensuring that the Director's above-mentioned statutory authority would not be impaired, supported by appropriate legislative history. Blandford said he couldn't "guarantee" anything but said we could be sure that this particular Committee represented a sympathetic forum and would do everything possible to protect us. He added that if we received a complete exemption from the Intelligence Subcommittee, we would then be more vulnerable to subpoena by the Moorhead Subcommittee which we would find far less sympathetic. Mr. Cary suggested that one solution might be for the Director himself to appear in executive session after which his testimony could be sanitized and appropriate portions made public.

5. Blandford said the Committee was very anxious to get a witness from the Agency who could testify as to the importance of protecting the security of intelligence information. He pointed out most of the witnesses and virtually all the publicity regarding the security and classification question was on the side of declassifying and publicizing information, and that competitive witnesses had to be found to state the other side of the case. In this connection, he asked whether someone like [] Agency representative on the USIB Security Committee, might appear in behalf of the Agency.

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6. I said I thought this unlikely, and Mr. Cary suggested that the Director might possibly agree to testify in executive session but permit his sanitized testimony to be made public later. Blandford seemed to think this might be a suitable solution, but emphasized that in any event they would like some solid testimony emphasizing the unique sensitivity of information relating to intelligence operations, procedures, sources and methods, perhaps illustrated with specific examples, which would justify treating intelligence information separately from any other types of classified information in the proceedings of the proposed Commission.

7. When I reported the foregoing to the Director, he said that he could not agree to testify before the Committee if his testimony was to be made public, that he already told Mr. Nedzi of his views in this matter, and that he felt the Committee should try to get their testimony on the points in question from Secretary Laird, who controlled most of the community resources and assets.

8. I called Blandford back to relay the Director's views, which Blandford received sympathetically. He said he realized we were in a dilemma--that if the Director's testimony was made public it would set a precedent, but if the Director didn't testify, the Moorhead Committee could claim that since the Nedzi Committee had failed to call CIA, and since CIA was an important factor in the whole classification and security situation, Moorhead was fully justified in stepping in.

9. I told Blandford that in any event I'd appreciate his relaying the Director's view to the Chairman and letting us know the results. Blandford said he wasn't sure the Chairman would insist that the Director's testimony in executive session be made public and that Nedzi might agree to hear the Director informally and off-the-record. I said I would mention this possibility to the Director. 25X1

[Redacted Signature]

JOHN M. MAURY
Legislative Counsel

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5. (Secret - JGO) Met with Mr. Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, and gave him a blind memorandum dated 23 February on "The Cost of Soviet Occupation Forces." This is in response to a question raised in yesterday's meeting with Mr. Slatinshek and members of the House Armed Services Committee staff.

I also briefed Mr. Slatinshek on the new type Soviet silos and deactivation of older silos; Chic-13; and Mao-class submarines.

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7. (Internal Use Only - LLM) Called Bob Vagley, Director of the Labor Subcommittee, House Education and Labor Committee, and he told me he expected the conference committee to meet on S. 2515, Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act, on Monday or Tuesday of next week and that the managers on the part of the House most likely would consist of the membership of the Labor Subcommittee. It was agreed that we would meet as soon as possible (he will be out until Friday) concerning the amendments we would like the conferees to use. He said that if he was absent, Tom Hart, of the Subcommittee staff, would be helpful in setting up a meeting with Representative John Erlenborn (R., Ill.), Ranking Minority Member, and other members whose support he thinks may be important.

8. (Internal Use Only - LLM) Received a call from Mr. McEwen, in the office of Senator Sam Ervin (D., N. C.), for a China Atlas. I told him that we would be happy to provide an atlas to the Senator and would do so, but that we did not have sufficient supply to satisfy all constituent requests. Mr. McEwen seemed to appreciate this and in connection with subsequent requests, said they would have no problem in merely stating that they had had only one copy of the atlas which they had already given away.

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Subsequently, I spoke to Messrs. Angus Thuermer, [redacted] and John Kerry King, suggesting that we might make the atlas available to the depository libraries through the Library of Congress, thereby providing greater access to the atlas for the public at large, which would be helpful in responding to the run-of-the-mill requests for a copy of the map. Mr. King said he would be investigating this along with a number of other possibilities and would let us know the outcome.

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23 February 1972

MEMORANDUM

The Cost of Soviet Occupation Forces

The East European countries do not contribute significantly toward maintaining Soviet forces in the area. In 1956-57, as part of Khrushchev's attempts at normalization, the USSR relieved Hungary and Poland from contributing to the support of Soviet garrisons. East Germany was freed of this obligation in 1959. The terms of the 1968 agreement on the stationing of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia, which offer the most complete information on such arrangements, show that the expenditure incurred by the stay of Soviet troops will be fully paid by the Soviet side "in goods necessary for the Czechoslovak national economy," in accord with Czechoslovak norms, regulations, and prices.

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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Tuesday - 22 February 1972

1. (Internal Use Only - JGO) Talked to Mr. Austin Smith, House Appropriations Committee staff, who told me that the House Appropriations Committee is not introducing a continuing resolution today nor is one planned at the present time to continue authorization for AID or the Radios.

25X1

2. (Secret - JGO) Accompanied Messrs. Bruce Clarke, [REDACTED] OSR, to a meeting with Messrs. Frank Slatinshek, John R. Blandford, and John Ford, House Armed Services Committee staff, concerning the costing of Soviet R&D and defense programs, MBFR and Backfire.

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I also gave Mr. Slatinshek a copy of the AP wire story of 15 February concerning Chairman Nedzi's statement to the press that one of the major targets of his Subcommittee will be to find out who picked the Central Intelligence Agency to run clandestine military operations in Laos. Mr. Slatinshek told me he had seen the press release but had not discussed it with Chairman Nedzi. He noted, however, that Chairman Nedzi's major concern at this point in time is with the classification problem.

25X1



4. (Unclassified - GLC) Rhoda Kachilo, in the office of Representative John H. Dent (D., Pa.), called to see if we could be of any assistance in determining whether one of Mr. Dent's constituents from Export, Pennsylvania, was a member of the U.S. delegation presently in Communist China. I told Miss Kachilo we would not have this information and suggested she contact either the State Department or the White House Congressional Liaison office.

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Press Item for the DCI

Date: 15 Feb
Item: No. 28
Ref: No.

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INTELLIGENCE PROBE

BY JIM ADAMS

WASHINGTON (AP)-THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NEW HOUSE INTELLIGENCE SUBCOMMITTEE SAYS ONE OF ITS MAJOR TARGETS WILL BE TO FIND OUT WHO PICKED THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO RUN CLANDESTINE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND WHY.

REP. LUCIEN N. NEDZI, D-MICH., ONE OF THE HOUSE'S MOST PERSISTENT VIETNAM WAR CRITICS, SAID IN AN INTERVIEW HE COULD NOT RULE OUT SOME FUTURE NEED FOR THE "DIPLOMATIC SUBTERFUGE" OF ANOTHER SECRET U.S. MILITARY OPERATION.

BUT HE SAID IT SHOULD NEVER AGAIN BE RUN BY AN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY--OR BY ANYONE ELSE--WITHOUT THE INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT AT LEAST KNOWLEDGE OF CONGRESS.

NEDZI SAID THE POLICY DECISION TO PUT THE CIA IN CHARGE OF U.S. LAOS OPERATIONS--NOT THEIR MORALITY--WILL BE A SUBJECT OF HIS SUBCOMMITTEE'S INQUIRY INTO THE INTELLIGENCE ESTABLISHMENT THIS YEAR.

NEDZI SAID HE PLANS ALSO TO INVESTIGATE WHAT HE CALLED THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS BASING COMBAT DECISIONS ON THEIR OWN INTELLIGENCE WITHOUT OUTSIDE ASSESSMENT--AND ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH OPERATIONS.

NEDZI HAS NO SCHEDULE FOR HIS SUBCOMMITTEE'S PROBE EXCEPT THAT IT MUST BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE YEAR AND HOPEFULLY, HE SAID, BEFORE THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS.

THE PROBE WILL INCLUDE OPEN HEARINGS BUT NEDZI MADE CLEAR HE WILL NOT PRESS CIA AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS TO BREAK

LONGSTANDING POLICY AND TESTIFY IN PUBLIC.

"I DON'T INTEND TO GET SIDETRACKED WITH THAT KIND OF CONFRONTATION," HE SAID.

QUESTIONS BESIDE LAOS, HE SAID, WILL INCLUDE WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT HAS TOO MANY DUPLICATING INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, WHETHER ALL THE INTELLIGENCE THEY GATHER IS READILY NEEDED AND WHETHER THE MILITARY HAS HALTED ALL CIVILIAN SURVEILLANCE AS THE PENTAGON SAYS IT HAS.

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Comment: Maury, Thuermer and CSDO have copies.